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Labour market integration and innovation: the implications on 
consumers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
An important purpose of economic integration is to reduce the barriers to trade in goods and 
the factors of production. Many countries are gradually reducing the barriers to the 
movements of goods and capital, yet the movements of labour – mainly from the developing 
to the developed countries – are still very much restricted. It is intuitive that labour 
movements reduce wage and create adverse effects on the substitutable workers in the 
recipient countries, but they benefit the consumers. While these effects of labour movements 
got attention in the economics literature (Gaston and Nelson, 2007 and the references therein), 
they ignore an empirically relevant factor, viz., the effects of labour movements on 
innovation, which also affects consumer surplus. 
The relationship between migration and innovation has been investigated empirically 
by a number of papers (see, Rashidi and Pyka, 2013 for a review). This literature generally 
provides a positive effect of migration of skilled workers on innovation due to network 
(Saxanian et al., 2003) and diversity (Parrotta, 2014). However, similar conclusion may not 
necessarily apply to unskilled migration. For example, a report by International Organisation 
for Migration (Platonova and Urso, 2010, page 323) has expressed the view that migration 
may negatively affect innovation through the availability of cheap labour. A similar view has 
also been expressed by the Migration Advisory Committee (Migration Advisory Committee, 
2013, page 174). 
We use a simple model to provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. 
More specifically, considering an international oligopoly, we analyse the effects of labour 
market integration on consumers, highlighting its strategic effects on innovation. We show 
that the effects of labour movement in the presence of innovation are not straightforward, and 
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the effects on consumers depend on several factors such as the market size, labour 
coefficients, wage and the type of migrated workers (i.e., skilled or unskilled workers). 
We consider a model with two competing innovating firms from different countries 
with different wages. We visualise the low-wage country as a developing country and the 
high-wage country as a developed country. We show the effects of labour market integration 
on innovation and consumers’ welfare, when integration creates the possibility of labour 
mobility from the low-wage country to the high-wage country.
1
 For a better understanding, 
we consider two separate cases: (i) when only the firm in the high-wage country innovates 
and (ii) when only the firm in the low-wage country innovates. This distinction is for 
understanding the theoretical effects clearly and in no way, we visualise a situation where 
only the firm from a developing country innovates. In this framework, we show the effects of 
migration of skilled workers, used for innovation, and unskilled workers, used for production, 
separately. The effects of innovation by both firms and migration of both skilled and 
unskilled workers then follow easily from our analysis. 
It is worth pointing out that while earlier papers consider innovative activities only in 
the developed countries (Helpman, 1993 and Lai, 1998), recent empirical evidence shows 
significant innovative activities in many developing countries also, such as India and China 
(Unnikrishnan, 2004 and Wei et al., 2008). In different contexts, recent papers have started to 
focus on the innovative activities of the developing countries (Zhou et al., 2002, Chen and 
Puttitanun, 2005 and Sinha and Mukherjee, 2013). It is also evident from the data shown in 
Table 1 that the developing countries are progressing fast in research and development. The 
leading country in 2013 was China with 704936 applications. About half of the top 15 
countries are developing or newly developed countries. What is very interesting is that the 
countries like China, Korea, India, Brazil, Turkey and Poland exhibit very high growth rate of 
                                                 
1
 We observe that, on one hand, firms from Mexico, China, India and Eastern European countries compete in the 
product markets with firms from the developed countries and, on the other hand, the former countries export 
skilled and unskilled workers to the developed countries. 
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patent applications (shown in the last column) compared to the other developed countries like 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy  and Canada. The only exception is United States 
that exhibits a 19% growth rate. 
 
Table 1 
 
Our analysis generates the following results. First, consider the possibility of 
migration of unskilled workers following labour market integration. If only the firm in the 
high-wage country innovates, labour market integration may either increase or decrease 
innovation and consumer surplus depending on the market size, labour coefficients and wage. 
If only the firm in the low-wage country innovates, labour market integration reduces 
innovation but it may either increase or decrease consumer surplus depending on the labour 
coefficients and wage. It is then immediate that labour market integration may either increase 
or decrease innovation and consumer surplus if both firms innovate. 
Now consider the possibility of migration of skilled workers following labour market 
integration. If only the firm in the high-wage country innovates, labour market integration 
increases innovation and consumer surplus. If both firms innovate, labour market integration 
increases (reduces) innovation of the firm in the high-wage (low-wage) country. Since the 
increase in innovation in the high-wage country is higher than the decrease in innovation in 
the low-wage country, labour market integration increases consumer surplus.
2
 
Our results can be useful for recent policy debates on integration of labour markets. 
The public opinion in developed countries is now questioning the effects of immigration, 
specifically in the European Union with reference to the free movement of labour from one 
member country to another member country. Our results show how the possibility of labour 
                                                 
2
 Migration of skilled workers does not occur in our analysis if only the firm in the low-wage country innovates.  
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migration from a low-wage European country to a high-wage European country may affect 
the consumers by affecting innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the model and shows the implications of migration of unskilled workers 
on innovation and consumers’ welfare. Section 4 shows the effects of migration of skilled 
workers. Section 5 discusses the implications of some of our assumptions and section 6 
concludes. Several mathematical calculations are relegated to Appendix. 
 
2. Literature review 
Our paper is related to the recently growing literature on economic integration and innovation. 
The existing literature uncovers the relation between product market integration and foreign 
direct investment (Chen 2009, Haufler and Wooton 2010), trade and welfare (Egger and 
Larch 2011), trade barriers, innovations and R&D subsidies (Haaland and Kind 2008, Braun 
2008, Impullitti 2010, Long et al. 2011 and Morita 2012). In contrast, we show the effects of 
labour market integration under endogenous technology choice. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the relationship between labour migration and 
innovation is getting more attention in recent decades. Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) used 
a quality ladder endogenous growth model and showed, by using computer simulation, that 
migration to the Northern country increases innovation in the North, decreases innovation in 
the South and reduces the price. In contrast, we show that the possibility of migration 
following labour market integration may either increase or decrease innovation and price 
depending on the factors such as the market size, labour coefficients, wage and the type of 
  
5 
migrated workers (i.e., skilled or unskilled workers).
3
 Our results are due to the strategic 
effects of labour market integration on innovation. 
 Kuhn and McAusland (2009) showed the implications of migration of a producer on 
process innovation or quality of the product and consumers’ welfare under segmented 
markets. In contrast, we consider migration of workers (unskilled workers) and researchers 
(skilled workers) on innovation and consumers’ welfare when the producers do not change 
their locations. 
 The linkage between our paper and the recent brain drain literature (See Gibson and 
McKenzie, 2011; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012 for recent reviews of the literature) is also 
clearly recognisable. The brain drain literature mainly analyses the economic benefit of 
migration on the source country. In contrast, we look at the effects on both the source and the 
recipient countries. Unlike the brain drain literature, which generally considers exogenous 
technologies, we determine the technologies endogenously. Thus, our analysis gives a clear 
guidance to the economists and the policy makers dealing with the issues related to 
integration of labour markets of the developed and developing countries. 
Finally, our paper can also be related to Marjit and Mukherjee (2008), which show the 
effects of outsourcing on the innovation of the outsourcing firm in the developed country. In 
contrast, we show how labour market integration, creating the possibility of migration of 
skilled and unskilled workers, affects innovation of the firms from developed and developing 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Bretchger (2001) also considers innovation and migration in a growth model. However, unlike our paper, 
where innovation provides know-how to the final goods, innovation in that paper provides know-how to the 
intermediate goods. 
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3. The model 
Consider two countries – 1 and 2, with integrated markets. Assume that there is firm 1 in 
country 1 and firm 2 in country 2. The firms compete like Cournot duopolists with 
homogeneous products. We assume that the inverse market demand function is 
 21 qqap           (1) 
where p  is the price and iq  is the output of firm i, 21,i  . 
Assume that besides production, the firms also undertake process innovation. We 
assume for simplicity that both production and innovation require only labour. However, 
production and innovation require different types of workers. We call the workers in the 
production as unskilled workers and the workers in innovation as skilled workers. We assume 
that the respective group of workers are perfect substitutes in both countries, labour supply of 
each type of worker (i.e., skilled and unskilled) is perfectly elastic in both countries and 
wages of the unskilled and skilled workers in the ith country, 1,2i  , are uiw  and siw  
respectively with 1 2u uw w  and 1 2s sw w . Hence, country 1 is a high-wage country and 
country 2 is a low-wage country to start with. Institutional reasons such as a stronger trade 
union may be the reason for the wage difference. 
We assume that firm 1 requires 1  unskilled workers to produce one unit of the 
product and firm 2 requires 2  unskilled workers to produce one unit of the product. Process 
innovations by the firms reduce labour coefficients in the production process. We assume that 
if the firms hire more skilled workers for innovation (i.e., investing more in innovation), on 
one hand, they can reduce the labour coefficients in the production process by a greater extent, 
but on the other hand, they need to incur higher costs for innovation. Specifically, we assume 
that if the ith firm, 1,2i  , hires 
 
2
2
iR
 skilled workers, thus spending  
 
2
2
si i
i i
w R
c R   
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amount in innovation, it can reduce the labour coefficient by 
i ib R . Hence, following the 
tradition of the innovation literature (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), we assume that 
there are diminishing returns to R&D expenditure, which may be due to the cost of 
coordinating more researchers. 
We will consider two situations in the following analysis: (i) the case of no labour 
market integration, and (ii) the case of labour market integration. We assume that labour 
market integration creates perfect mobility of workers between the countries and allows firm 
1 to hire workers at the low-wage prevailed in country 2.
4
 Perfectly elastic labour supply in 
country 2 implies that labour market integration does not affect the wage in country 2. If 
country 2 is endowed with a large pool of labour force or labour demand in the industry 
under consideration is not significant relative to the amount of available workers in country 2, 
migration of some people from country 2 to country 1 would not have much effect on the 
wage in country 2, thus justifying stickiness in wage in country 2. Hence, labour market 
integration allows both firms to hire workers at the lower wage prevailed in country 2. 
Wages of the unskilled and skilled workers in country 1 are 1uuw  and 1ssw  
respectively, where 1u s    under no labour market integration, and 
1
2
u
u
u
w
w
  and 
2
1
s
s
s
w
w
   under labour market integration. It may be worth noting that wage equality is the 
artefact of no cost of immigration, which we assume for simplicity. It is immediate that a 
positive cost of immigration does not equate wage in both countries following labour market 
integration, although the possibility of migration allows the firm in the high-wage country to 
hire workers at a lower wage. Our qualitative results hold even if labour market integration 
does not reduce the high wage all the way to equate it with the low wage. 
                                                 
4
 It is intuitive that if the workers in firm 1 demands wages more than what is prevailed in country 2 (the low-
wage country), firm 1 would be able to hire workers from country 2, thus either inducing the workers of country 
1 to accept the wage prevailed in country 2 or allowing firm 1 to hire workers from country 2. 
  
8 
We have assumed constant wages for analytical simplicity. The presence of surplus 
unskilled workers in many economies may justify a constant wage for unskilled workers. It 
may not be unreasonable also to assume a constant wage for skilled workers if the number of 
workers employed in the industry under question is sufficiently small compared to the total 
number of workers available in the economy. 
To show the effects of migration of unskilled and skilled workers, we will consider 
two cases separately: (i) 
1 2u uw w  and 1 2s s sw w w   and (ii) 1 2u u uw w w   and 1 2s sw w . 
Labour market integration will create the possibility of migration of unskilled (skilled) 
workers from country 2 to country 1 in Case (i) (Case (ii)). We made these assumptions just 
for analytical simplicity, so that we can understand the effects of different types of migration 
clearly. In other words, for analytical simplicity, we separate out the effects of one type of 
wage difference when looking at the effects of another type of wage difference. It is needless 
to say that this simplification does not affect our qualitative results. 
We consider the following game under no labour market integration and under labour 
market integration. At stage 1, the firms determine investments in innovation. At stage 2, they 
take their output decisions like Cournot duopolists and hire workers accordingly. We solve 
the game through backward induction. 
 
3.1. Integration creating the possibility of migration of unskilled workers 
We assume in this subsection the same wages for the skilled workers, i.e., 1 2s s sw w w  , but 
higher wages of the unskilled workers in country 1 under no integration, i.e., 1 2u uw w . 
 
3.1.1. The output stage 
Firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions respectively to determine the outputs: 
  
9 
 
1
1 1 2 1 1Max u u
q
a q q w q      and  
2
2 1 2 2 2Max u
q
a q q w q       (2) 
where   1111 RbR  ,   2222 RbR  , 1u   under no labour market integration, and 
1
2
u
u
u
w
w
  under labour market integration. 
The equilibrium outputs are 
3
2 21
1
uuu wwaq
 


        (3) 
3
2 12*
2
uuu wwaq
 
 .        (4) 
The outputs of both firms are positive for 02 21  uuu wwa  and 
02 12  uuu wwa  , which are assumed to hold. 
The profits of firms 1 and firm 2 are respectively 
 
9
2
2
21*
1
uuu wwa 

         (5) 
 
9
2
2
12*
2
uuu wwa 

 .       (6) 
  
3.2. The innovation stage 
Firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions to determine their investments in 
innovation: 
    
 11
2
2211
1
9
2
Rc
wRwRa uuu 



     (7) 
    
 22
2
1122
2
9
2
Rc
wRwRa uuu 



 ,     (8) 
where 
2
1
1 1 2 2( ) ( )
2
sw Rc R c R   under both no integration and integration. 
The equilibrium investments in innovation are given by the following expressions: 
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  


1121
1
1 2
9
4
cwwwa
R
uuuuu       (9) 
  2212
2
2 2
9
4
cwwwa
R
uuuu





.               (10) 
We assume that the second order conditions for maximisation are satisfied (See Appendix A 
for the calculation). 
We determine the equilibrium investments in innovation by solving (9) and (10). The 
calculations for the equilibrium investments are given in Appendix A. 
 
3.3. The effects of labour market integration on innovation and consumer surplus 
To show the effects of labour market integration on the equilibrium investments in innovation, 
we first consider two special cases: (i) if only firm 1 innovates, and (ii) if only firm 2 
innovates. It will then be easy to understand the effects of labour market integration under 
innovation by both firms, since this situation will be a combination of these special cases. 
However, as mentioned already, in no way, we visualise a situation where only the firm from 
a developing country, i.e., firm 2, innovates. We consider this case just for the clarity of our 
analysis. 
 
3.3.1. Only firm 1 innovates 
If only the firm in the high-wage country, i.e., firm 1, innovates, the labour coefficients for 
firms 1 and 2 are respectively 1  and 1 . 
 
Proposition 1: If only firm 1 (i.e., the firm in the high-wage country) innovates and labour 
market integration creates the possibility of migration of unskilled workers only, labour 
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market integration decreases (increases) R&D investment compared to no integration if 
   1 1 2 2 22 ( )nm u u ua R w w w     .  
Proof: If only firm 1 innovates and labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of unskilled workers only, the equilibrium R&D investments of firm 1 under no 
integration and integration are respectively: 
 1 2 2 1 1
4
2
9
u u u sa w w w w R                                (11) 
 2 2 2 2 1
4
2
9
u u u sa w w w w R      .               (12) 
Denote the equilibrium R&D investment of firm 1 under no labour market integration by 
1nmR . Evaluating left hand sides (LHSs) of (11) and (12) at 1nmR , we get that LHS (11)    
LHS (12) if    1 1 2 2 22 ( )nm u u ua R w w w     , suggesting that labour market integration 
decreases (increases) firm 1’s equilibrium R&D investment compared to no integration. ■ 
 
 Figure 1 is drawn to facilitate understanding of Proposition 1. The intersections of the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost curves determine the equilibrium investments in 
innovation
5
. We draw three marginal benefit curves. The middle one is under no integration. 
Under no integration, the marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost at A . The bottom one 
shows that integration shifts the marginal benefit curve downward, creating the new 
equilibrium at B , and reducing the equilibrium investment under integration. The top one 
shows that integration shifts the marginal benefit curve upward, creating the new equilibrium 
at C , and increasing the equilibrium investment under integration. However, if integration 
                                                 
5
The expressions for marginal benefit from innovation are   2 21 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
4 8
2
9 9
u u u ub w a w w b w R     under 
no integration, and   2 21 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
4 8
2
9 9
u u u ub w a w w b w R     under integration. 
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shifts the marginal benefit curve upward, it is not certain that the equilibrium investment 
increases always, since the marginal benefit curve is now flatter and may intersect the 
marginal cost curve at a point where the investment is lower. 
 
 
  
Intuitively, labour market integration creates two effects. On one hand, given the 
output of firm 1, a lower wage following integration reduces firm 1’s marginal benefit from 
innovation by increasing its per-unit profit. This effect is positively related to the output of 
firm 1, which is positively related to a. Hence, due to this effect, the higher the a is, the lower 
is the incentive for innovation following integration. On the other hand, a lower wage 
increases the marginal benefit from innovation by increasing output and this effect is 
MB,MC  
1R  
nmR1  mR1  
Figure 1 
Equilibrium R&D with Unskilled Migration 
 (Only firm 1 innovates) 
A  
B  
1MC  
nmMB1  
mMB1  
C  
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independent of a. The overall effect depends on the strengths of these forces. The higher is a , 
i.e., the higher is the market size, the higher is the chance that the former effect dominates the 
latter. If a increases, LHS of the condition in Proposition 1 (i.e., 
   1 1 2 2 22 ( )nm u u ua R w w w     ) increases, while the right hand side (RHS) of that 
condition falls, since a higher a increases 1nmR  that reduces 1( )nmR . Therefore, if only the 
firm in the high-wage country innovates, labour market integration reduces (increases) the 
equilibrium investment in innovation in large (small) markets. Thus, if the market size is 
large, an effect similar to Arrow’s (1962) “replacement effect” is responsible for the 
innovation reducing effect of integration. On the other hand, if the market size is small, the 
effect of integration has a clear Schumpeterian overtone, where a cost reduction leads to 
increased innovation. The effects we observe here are similar to the effects of outsourcing on 
the investment in innovation in Marjit and Mukherjee (2008). 
The policy implication of this result is quite significant. There exists a notion in the 
policy literature that the availability of cheap labour may delay development and adoption of 
technological solutions and a labour shortage can encourage innovation (International 
Organization of Migration 2010, page 323; Migration Advisory Committee 2013, page 174) . 
The above result to some extent supports that view. 
 Since labour market integration affects investments in innovation and the marginal 
costs of production, the effects of integration on consumers are not immediate. Labour 
market integration increases consumer surplus if it increases the total output compared to no 
integration and it happens if the total marginal costs of the firms are lower under integration 
compared to no integration. By comparing the total outputs under integration and no 
integration, we obtain that labour market integration, creating the possibility of migration of 
unskilled workers, increases (decreases) consumers’ welfare if  1 2 1 1( ) ( )m u nm uR w R w   . 
Since firm 2’s marginal cost remains unaffected under labour market integration, the 
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comparison depends on firm 1’s marginal costs. Although integration reduces the wage in 
country 1 from 1uw  to 2uw , it increases the labour coefficient if the market is sufficiently 
large, as shown in Proposition 1. Hence, the marginal cost of firm 1 can be higher under 
integration if integration creates significant adverse effect on innovation, i.e., 1( )mR  is 
sufficiently higher compared to 
1( )nmR , so that the adverse technology effect dominates the 
beneficial wage effect. 
 The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 2: If only firm 1 (i.e., the firm in the high-wage country) innovates and labour 
market integration creates the possibility of migration of unskilled workers only, labour 
market integration may make the consumers worse off compared to no integration if the 
market is sufficiently large so that  1 1 2 2 22 ( )nm u u ua R w w w    . 
 
3.3.2. Only firm 2 innovates 
Proposition 3: If only firm 2 (i.e., the firm in the low-wage country) innovates and labour 
market integration creates the possibility of migration of unskilled workers only, labour 
market integration reduces the R&D investment of firm 2, but it hurts  (benefits) the  
consumers  if  
 
 
2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( )u m nm
u u
w R R
w w
 


 

. 
Proof:  If only firm 2 innovates and labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of unskilled workers only, the equilibrium R&D investments of firm 2 under no 
integration and integration are respectively: 
 2 1 1 2 2
4
2
9
u u ua w w w c                       (13) 
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 2 1 2 2 2
4
2
9
u u ua w w w c       .                (14) 
Denote the equilibrium R&D investment of firm 2 under no labour market integration by 
2nmR . Evaluating LHSs of (13) and (14) at 2nmR , we get that LHS of (13) > LHS of (14), 
suggesting that the labour market integration reduces the R&D investment of firm 2. 
In order to compare consumers’ welfare under no integration to that of under 
integration, we need to compare the respective equilibrium outputs. The total outputs under 
no integration and under integration are respectively  1 2 2
1
2 ( )
3
nm u nm uQ a w R w     and 
 2 2 2
1
2 ( )
3
m u m uQ a w R w    . We get that ( )nm mQ Q  for  
 
 
2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( )u m nm
u u
w R R
w w
 


 

, 
suggesting that consumers’ welfare are higher (lower) under no integration if 
 
 
 
2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( )u m nm
u u
w R R
w w
 


 

. ■ 
 
The intuitions for the above results are as follows. Given the R&D investment of firm 
2, labour market integration increases firm 1’s output and reduces firm 2’s output and profit, 
which, in turn, reduces firm 2’s investment in R&D. 
Given the R&D investment of firm 2, labour market integration creates cost efficiency 
in the industry by allowing migration of unskilled workers, which helps to increase the total 
output. However, since integration reduces the R&D investment of firm 2, it tends to reduce 
the total output. If integration reduces firm 2’s R&D investment significantly so that 
   1 2 2 2 2( ) ( )u u u m nmw w w R R     , integration reduces the total output and makes the 
consumers worse off. Otherwise, integration increases the total output and makes the 
consumers better off. 
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3.3.3. Innovation by both firms 
Now it must be clear that if both firms innovate, the effects of labour market integration will 
be the combinations of the effects shown in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.1. We discuss the 
implications of innovation by both firms briefly in this section. The calculations of the 
reaction functions and the equilibrium investments in innovation by firms 1 and 2 are given 
in Appendix B. Since the effects of integration on the equilibrium investments in innovation 
are cumbersome and clear cut results are difficult to obtain, we will plot the reaction 
functions in Figure 2 to evaluate the effects of integration. 
 In Figure 2, the solid line 1 shows firm 1’s reaction function under no integration. The 
reaction function under integration derived in Appendix B shows that the intercept in 1R  axis 
under integration may either increase or decrease, depending on the parameter values. In 
Figure 2, we draw the broken line 1 and the dotted line 3 to show firm 1’s reaction functions 
under integration when the intercept decreases and when the intercept increases respectively. 
It follows from Appendix B that, under integration, the intercept of firm 1’s reaction function 
in 2R  axis increases and the slope decreases. 
We have also plotted the reaction functions of firm 2 in Figure 2 by denoting them as 
line 2. The solid line 2 is the reaction function under no integration and the broken line 2 is 
the reaction function under integration. Integration increases the reaction function’s intercept 
in 1R  axis and makes the slope of the reaction function steeper. The reaction function’s 
intercept in the 2R  axis however falls after integration as can be observed from equation (A2) 
in Appendix A assuming 01 R . 
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 Proposition 1 shows that when firm 2 does not innovate, integration decreases 
(increases) firm 1’s investment in innovation if the market size is large (small). However, 
Proposition 3 shows that when firm 1 does not innovate, integration decreases firm 2’s 
investment in innovation. Hence, Propositions 1 and 3 show the effects of integration on the 
firms’ stand alone incentives for R&D investment. However, if both firms innovate, there is 
also a strategic incentive for R&D investment. Since the reaction functions for the R&D 
investments are downward sloping, as shown in Figure 2, higher R&D investment of one firm 
decreases the R&D investment of the other firm. Hence, it is immediate that if the market size 
is small, integration increases R&D investment of firm 1 and decreases the R&D investment 
of firm 2. However, if the market size is large, firm 1’s lower stand alone incentive for 
innovation after integration increases firm 2’s strategic incentive for innovation and vice-
versa. In this situation, whether integration decreases or increases the firms’ R&D 
2R  
1R  
(1) Reaction functions of firm 1 
(2) Reaction functions of firm 2 
(3) Reaction functions of firm 1 after 
integration when intercept in vertical 
axis is higher  
Figure 2 
Equilibrium R&D with Unskilled Migration 
 (Both firms innovate) 
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investments is ambiguous and depends on the relative strengths of the stand alone incentive 
and the strategic incentive, which depend on the parameter values. The reaction functions 1 
and 2 show the situation where integration increases the R&D investment of firm 1 and 
reduces the R&D investment firm 2. 
It must also be clear that if both firms innovate, the effects of integration on the 
consumers will be a combination of effects shown in Propositions 2 and 3, suggesting that 
consumers may be better off or worse off after integration compared to no integration 
depending on the parameter values. 
 
4. Integration creating migration of skilled workers only 
The above section has considered that wages of the unskilled workers are different under no 
labour market integration, and labour market integration creates the possibility of migration 
of unskilled workers. This section considers the other case where wages of the unskilled 
workers are the same but wages of the skilled workers are different under no integration, i.e., 
1 2u u uw w w   and 1 2s sw w   Hence, labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of skilled workers to country 1. 
 It is trivial that integration of labour markets in this section does not create the 
possibility of migration of skilled workers if firm 1 does not innovate, since skilled workers 
are used for innovation. Hence, we consider innovation by only firm 1 and innovation by 
both firms in this section. 
If wages of the unskilled workers are the same under no labour market integration and 
under labour market integration, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions 
respectively to determine the outputs: 
 
1
1 1 2 1Max u
q
a q q w q      and  
2
2 1 2 2Max u
q
a q q w q     .           (15) 
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The equilibrium outputs are 1
2
3
u ua w wq
     and *2
2
3
u ua w wq
  
 . The outputs of 
both firms are positive for 2 0u ua w w    and 2 0u ua w w    , which are assumed to 
hold. 
The profits of firms 1 and firm 2 are respectively 
 
2
*
1
2
9
u ua w w 
 
  and 
 
2
*
2
2
9
u ua w w 
 
 . 
 
4.1. Innovation by firm 1 only 
 If only firm 1 innovates and labour market integration creates the possibility of migration of 
only skilled workers, firm 1 maximises the following expression to determine the R&D 
investment: 
 
2
2
1 1 1 2 1 1
1
2
9 2
u u s s
a b R w w w R         , 
where 1s   under no integration and 
2
1
s
s
s
w
w
   under integration. The equilibrium R&D 
investment is 
2 2
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 2
1 1
4( 2 )
9 8
u u u
s s u
b aw b w b w
R
w b w
 

 


. The possibility of migration of only skilled 
workers following labour market integration reduces 2 21 19 8 ( 0)s s uw b w    and increases the 
R&D investment. 
Since integration increases R&D investment while keeping wages of the unskilled 
workers unchanged, it makes the consumers better off by increasing the total output. 
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
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Proposition 4: If only firm 1 innovates and labour market integration creates the possibility 
of migration of skilled workers only, labour market integration increases R&D investment 
and consumers’ welfare compared to no migration.  
 
The reason for the above result is as follows. The cost of doing R&D falls with 
integration and increases firm 1’s R&D investment, which increases the equilibrium output 
and welfare. 
Figure 3 shows what happens if the labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of skilled workers only. Migration of skilled people does not change the slope and 
intercept of the marginal benefit line as production requires unskilled workers. However, it 
reduces the marginal cost of undertaking innovation. As the marginal cost of undertaking 
innovation is always zero with no R&D, the marginal cost lines start from the origin. The 
marginal cost curve pivot down from the origin after integration. Hence, the equilibrium 
R&D investments under no integration and under integration occur at A  and B  respectively, 
suggesting that integration increases the R&D investment. 
 
  
21 
 
The above result points towards a beneficial effect of Brain Drain. Given the 
limitation of the developing countries in performing research, migration of the skilled people 
to the developed countries helps to create better technologies in the developed-country firms
6
, 
and it benefits the developed as well as the developing countries. The result somehow echoes 
that of Grubel and Scott (1966) on international flow of human capital. They mentioned that 
the largest benefit of people migrating abroad can come through the pure research of 
scientists and engineers. If the work condition in the new country is better, the productivity is 
high and the native country gains more from scientists emigrating abroad. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 For example, Rashidi and Pyka (2013) noted that about 50% of engineers and scientist employed in Silicon 
Valley are immigrants. 
MB,MC  
1R  
mR1  nmR1  
Figure 3 
Equilibrium R&D with Skilled Migration 
 (Only firm 1 innovates) 
 
B  
A  
nmMC1  
mMC1  
1MB  
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4.2. If both firms innovate 
If both firms innovate, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions to determine their 
investments in R&D: 
    
2
2
1 2 1 1
1
2
9 2
u u s s
a R w R w w R   
       
 
    
2
2
2 1 2 2
2
2
9 2
u u s
a R w R w w R  
   ,      
where 1s   under no integration and 
2
1
s
s
s
w
w
   under integration. 
 
Proposition 5: If both firms innovate and labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of skilled workers only, integration increases the R&D investment of firm 1 and 
decreases the R&D investment of firm 2. 
Proof:  The equilibrium R&D of firm 1 is derived in Appendix A. As  21 ss ww  , the 
denominator decreases with migration (see Appendix C). Hence, the equilibrium R&D 
investment of firm 1 increases with migration. 
 Now consider the effects of labour market integration of the equilibrium R&D 
investment of firm 2. If the marginal benefits are evaluated at no migration equilibrium R&D, 
we get that mnm MBMB 22  . In addition, by looking at the reaction function of firm 2 in 
equation (A2) of Appendix A, we see that firm 2 reduces the R&D investment for higher 
equilibrium R&D investment of firm 1. Therefore, R&D investment of firm 2 falls with the 
migration of skilled workers. ■ 
 
Firm 1 can now conduct R&D relatively cheaply under labour market integration. 
Hence, labour market integration increases firm 1’s marginal benefit from innovation 
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compared to no labour market integration, thus increasing firm 1’s R&D investment under 
integration compared to no integration. On the other hand, labour market integration reduces 
firm 2’s marginal benefit from innovation and reduces its R&D investment.  
To look at the matter further, we plot the reaction functions of two firms in Figure 4. 
For simplicity, we assume in the figure that bbb  21 ,   21  and uuu www  21 . 
Therefore, equations (A1) and (A2) in Appendix A are 
222
1
22
1
2
1
89
4
89
484
R
wbw
wbbw
wbw
wwbwbbaw
R
uss
uu
uss
uuuu







 and 
122
2
22
2
2
2
89
4
89
484
R
wbw
wbbw
wbw
wwbwbbaw
R
us
uu
us
uuuu






 respectively. 
In Figure 4, we have indicated the reaction function of firm 1 by the flatter lines 
denoted by (1). The flatter broken line indicates the reaction function of firm 1 under 
integration. The steeper line denoted by (2) is the reaction function of firm 2. Under 
integration, both firms experience the same wage, 2sw , for skilled workers. Given all other 
things same, the equilibrium R&D investments are the same under integration and they are 
indicated by point B , where the solid steeper line and the flatter broken line have crossed.  
Now we want to see the equilibrium R&D investment under no integration, i.e., if 
firm 1 faces the wage 1sw . We can see from the equations that the reaction function of firm 2 
remains unchanged. However, firm 1 has a different reaction function under no integration. 
Since 21 ss ww   under no integration, the vertical intercept of firm 1’s reaction function 
decreases. The denominator of the slope term is also higher for firm 1 as 21 ss ww  . Hence, 
the absolute slope of firm 1’s reaction function falls. Looking further at the equation, it can be 
seen that the horizontal intercept of firm 1’s reaction function remains unchanged. Therefore, 
firm 1’s reaction function is flatter under no integration and it is given by the solid line (1). 
The equilibrium R&D investments under no integration are indicated by point A . Hence, 
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labour market integration increases firm 1’s R&D investment and reduces firm 2’s R&D 
investment.  
 
 The effect of labour market integration on the consumers is not immediate as 
integration increases firm 1’s R&D investment but it reduces firm 2’s R&D investment. The 
consumer surplus is higher under integration if 
3
2 umum
m
wwa
Q
 
  is greater than 
3
2 unmunm
nm
wwa
Q
 
  or mnmnmm RRRR 2211  , i.e., the increase in firm 1’s R&D 
investment is higher than the reduction in firm 2’s R&D investment. Since integration does 
not affect firm 2’s reaction function, the change in the equilibrium R&D investments can be 
found through a movement along firm 2’s reaction function. We get that 
1 22
2 2
1 2 1
4
1
9 8
u u
s u
b b w wR
R w b w

 
 
, since the stability of the equilibrium requires 
2R  
1R  
B  
A  
(1) Reaction functions of firm 1 
(2) Reaction function of firm 2 
Figure 4 
Equilibrium R&D with Skilled Migration 
 (Both firms innovate) 
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22
1221 894 usuu wbwwwbb  , implying that the change in firm 1’s R&D investment is more 
than the change in firm 2’s R&D investment. Hence, labour market integration increases 
consumer surplus compared to no labour market integration.  
 The following result is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 6: If both firms innovate and labour market integration creates the possibility of 
migration of skilled workers only, integration makes the consumers better off. 
 
 The reason for the above result is as follows. Labour market integration reduces the 
skilled-wage and creates a stronger positive direct effect on firm 1’s R&D investment relative 
to the negative indirect effect on firm 2’s R&D investment. Thus, labour market integration 
increases consumer surplus. 
 
5. Discussions 
5.1. When the labour supply is not perfectly elastic 
The constant wages assumed in our analysis has helped to show our results in the simplest 
way. Moreover, as mentioned already, if the number of workers employed in the industry 
under question is sufficiently small compared to the number of workers available in the 
economy, a constant wage faced by the concerned industry may not be a reasonable 
assumption. However, our qualitative results would hold if the labour supplies are not 
perfectly elastic. 
 If the labour supply curves are not perfectly elastic, migration will tend to increase 
wage in the source country and it would tend to decrease wage in the recipient country. 
Hence, unlike our analysis, wage under migration would not be equal to the initial low-wage. 
Rather, it would be somewhere between the initial high-wage and the low-wage. Hence, 
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following migration, output expansion in the recipient country’s firm and output contraction 
in the source country’s firm would be less compared to our analysis. As a result, on one hand, 
the effect on the marginal benefit from innovation due to a change in the wage would be 
lower, and on the other hand, the effect on the marginal benefit from innovation due to a 
change in the output would also be lower. Hence, if the labour supplies are not perfectly 
elastic, whether the effects of migration will tend to increase or decrease innovation 
compared to our case, where the labour supplies are perfectly elastic, would depend on these 
two effects, which, in turn, would depend on the elasticities of labour supply and labour 
demand. 
 
5.2. The effects of entry 
The analysis of Section 3 shows that labour market integration creates a trade-off between 
low wage and low R&D investment and may make the consumers worse off following labour 
market integration. We have derived those results under a given market structure, thus 
ignoring the implications of market entry in the recipient country following labour market 
integration. However, lower wage in the recipient country following labour market 
integration may encourage entry of new firms, thus creating further impacts. Now we discuss 
briefly the implications of entry of new firms.
7
 
Entry of new firms creates two opposite effects on the incentive for innovation. First, 
as competition increases, for a given R&D investment, entry of new firms reduces the 
innovating firm’s market share and profit, thus decreasing the incentive for R&D investment. 
This effect has a clear Schumpeterian overtone, where lower profit generation reduces the 
incentive for innovation. On the other hand, since innovation helps the innovating firm to 
steal business from its competitors by reducing the innovator’s marginal cost, higher 
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to discuss this issue. 
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competition in the market following entry may encourage the innovator to invest more in 
R&D to secure a higher market share. This effect is similar to Arrow’s (1962) “replacement 
effect” that increases the incentive for innovation under higher competition. Hence, the effect 
of entry on innovation may be non-monotonic, and whether entry of new firms will increase 
or decrease the incentive for innovation will therefore depend on the market-share effect, 
which tends to reduce R&D investment, and on the business stealing effect, which tends to 
increase R&D investment.
8
 
 The above argument implies that if labour market integration encourages entry of new 
firms by reducing wage, whether it increases or decreases the possible trade-off on consumer 
surplus by reducing both wage and R&D investment is not immediate and depends on the 
above-mentioned market-share effect and the business stealing effect. In this respect, whether 
the entrants are innovators or non-innovators may also play an important role. These issues 
deserve a separate full-fledged analysis and we leave them for future research. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We analyse the effects of labour market integration on consumers’ welfare, highlighting its 
effect on innovation. Labour market integration creates the possibility of migration of skilled 
and unskilled workers. Skilled workers used for innovation and unskilled workers are used 
for production. We show that if labour market integration creates the possibility of migration 
of skilled workers, it increases investments in innovation and benefits the consumers. 
However, if labour market integration creates the possibility of migration of unskilled 
workers, the effects on both innovation and consumers are ambiguous. Our results suggest 
that the effects of labour market integration on the consumers depend on several factors such 
                                                 
8
 In an earlier work, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) show the relation between product-market concentration and 
the R&D intensity. The relation between the number of firms and R&D investment also follows from a more 
recent work of Mattoo et al. (2004). However, those papers ignore the issue of labour immigration, which is the 
focus of our paper.  
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as the market size, labour coefficients, wage and the type of migrated workers (i.e., skilled or 
unskilled workers). 
This paper is supporting to some extent the recent literature showing the beneficial 
effects of international labour migration. The literature claims that benefit of international 
migration can occur through increased human capital formation. This paper points to another 
channel, viz., through R&D investment. If the R&D investments are higher, production of 
output can be higher and consequently price can be lower. As we have seen, labour market 
integration may increase the total output by increasing the R&D investments. Labour market 
integration always increases the R&D investment when it creates the possibility of migration 
of skilled workers. However, the possibility of migration of unskilled workers under 
integration may create negative effects on the R&D investments, yet may increase the total 
output. 
It is important to note that many countries may not have resources to conduct 
innovation, although they may create professionals, such as computer engineers, aeronautical 
engineers, marine engineers, pharmaceutical and chemical engineers, for conducting 
innovation. Recent Brain Drain literature claims that international migration is beneficial as it 
gives incentive to acquire these skills. For example, it is possible for many countries to train 
pharmacists and chemists relatively cheaply, but they may not have large pharmaceutical 
sectors. Hence, knowledge created in those countries may not be useful unless that is used in 
other places. 
We show in this paper that migration of skilled people may bring benefit through 
higher R&D. When labour markets are integrated, skilled workers can migrate and contribute 
by innovating better technologies, and the benefit of better technologies flow to both the 
source and the recipient countries. However, as shown, the effects of migration of unskilled 
workers are not so straightforward. 
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Our paper is a first step to show the effects of labour market integration on consumers 
through its effect on innovation. A natural way to analyse this problem is to consider a partial 
equilibrium analysis focusing on a particular industry. While a partial equilibrium analysis 
helps us to show the strategic effects easily, it ignores income effects. An extension of our 
paper will be to consider a general equilibrium approach with innovation, thus incorporating 
both the strategic effects and the income effects of labour market integration. In this respect, 
other issues such as unemployment in the economy, affecting the income effects, may also 
worth considering. We leave these issues for future research. 
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Appendix 
A: From equation (9), we get the reaction function of firm 1 as: 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
1 22 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
4 8 4 4
9 8 9 8
u u u u u u u u u u
s u u s u u
b a w b w b w w b b w w
R R
w b w w b w
    
 
 
 
 
.               (A1) 
We assume that  1 1 1 2 22 0u u ua w w    , so that the outputs and the profits are positive. 
Therefore, 1221
2
1
2
1111 484 uuuuuuu wwbwbwab    is positive. We also assume that 
2 2 2
1 19 8 0s u uw b w   to ensure 01 R  when 02 R . The own second partial and the cross 
second partial derivatives are  
2
2 2 21
1 12
1
1
8 9
9
u u sb w w
R

 
 

 and 2121
21
1
2
9
4
uuu wwbb
RR





. 
Both the derivatives are negative by assumption. 
 From equation (10), the reaction function of firm 2 is obtained as:  
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 12 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
4 8 4 4
9 8 9 8
u u u u u u u u
s u s u
b aw b w b w w b b w w
R R
w b w w b w
    
 
 
.           (A2) 
Again, 2112
2
22222 484 uuuuu wwbwbawb    is negative as required for the positive output 
and profit. In addition, we assume that 2 22 29 8 0s uw b w   to ensure that 02 R  when 01 R . 
Hence, the own second partial and cross second partial derivatives are 
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2
2 22
2 22
2
1
8 9
9
u sb w w
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 
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 and 2121
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. Stability requires 
that
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2
RRR 




. 
 The equilibrium values of 1R  and 2R , obtained from equations (A1) and (A2) using 
the Cramer’s rule, are 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 21
1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
48 48
36 72 36
u u u u u u
u u s u u s u u u s
b a w b w b w b w
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b a w w b w w b w w w
  

    
 
  
      
          (A3) 
  
31 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 11
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
48 48
36 72 36
u u u u u u
u s u s u u u s
b aw b w b w b w
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,           (A4) 
where 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 2 1 2 2 2 1 148 72 72 81u u u u s u u s s sb b w w b w w b w w w        and 
1 is the inverse 
of  . We assume that the denominator is positive so that the solutions are positive and stable.  
 
B: Reaction functions of firm 1 in section 3.4:  
Under no integration, 22
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Under integration, 22
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The intercept in horizontal axis:  
When 01 R ,  
221
2211111
2121
1221
2
11111
2
4
484
4
484
u
uu
uu
uuuu
wbb
wbwbab
wwbb
wwbwbawb
R
 


  under no 
integration, and 
221
2212111
2
4
484
u
uu
wbb
wbwbab
R
 
  under integration. 
 
Changes in the slope:  
Migration in our case reduces the value of u . To find out the effect of a change in u  on the 
slope, we can differentiate the slope term of the reaction function by u . Let S  be the slope. 
Therefore,  
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As 
2
1
22
189 uus wbw   is positive by assumption, the slope moves to the opposite direction of 
the change of u . The slope is negative. Hence the slope is steeper if u increases. If u  falls, 
  
32 
the slope is flatter. Therefore, under integration, as u falls, we get a relatively flatter reaction 
function. 
 
Reaction functions of firm 2 in section 3.4:  
Using equation (A2), we get that 
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 if there is integration. 
 
C.  
The denominator is given as : 
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We have 1s  under no integration and 
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  under integration. By subtracting, 
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As   089 2222  us wbw  by assumption,    0899 212222  ssus wwwbw . Therefore, R&D of 
firm 1 increases as   falls under integration.  
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Table 1: Patent applications (of residents) 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Percentage 
change from 
2010 to 2013 
China 293066 415829 535313 704936 141% 
United States 241977 247750 268782 287831 19% 
Japan 290081 287580 287013 271731 -6% 
Korea, Rep. 131805 138034 148136 159978 21% 
Germany 47047 46986 46620 47353 1% 
Russian Federation 28722 26495 28701 28765 0% 
United Kingdom 15490 15343 15370 14972 -3% 
France 14748 14655 14540 14690 0% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 11108 11529 10622 11305 2% 
India 8853 8841 9553 10669 21% 
Italy 8877 8794 8439 8307 -6% 
Brazil 4228 4695 4798 4959 17% 
Canada 4550 4754 4709 4567 0% 
Turkey 3180 3885 4434 4392 38% 
Poland 3203 3879 4410 4237 32% 
Source – World Development Indicators, World Bank, Last Updated: 04/14/2015 
 
 
